

**MONITOR'S REPORT ON
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
POLICE VEHICLE STOP STUDY**

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Monitor's Report on University of Cincinnati Police Vehicle Stop Study

I. Introduction

Across the country, law enforcement agencies are trying to address concerns about racial profiling. The belief that law enforcement officers are biased and disrespectful undermines the trust and confidence that is so essential to effective policing. The City of Cincinnati is just one of many cities with a long history of strained and at times volatile relationships between the police and minority communities. To address this problem, the City of Cincinnati has entered into a Collaborative Agreement with community stakeholders and the Fraternal Order of Police.

The Collaborative Agreement is designed to build trust, create partnerships between the police and community, and promote bias-free policing. The "ultimate goal" of the Collaborative Agreement is to reduce the friction between members of the community and the police department, and "foster a safer community where mutual trust and respect is enhanced among citizens and police." This is to be accomplished through community engagement, dialogue, problem solving and specific provisions relating to bias-free policing.

Data collection is one piece of that effort. In March 2001, the Cincinnati City Council passed an ordinance requiring the police to collect information on the race of persons in vehicles stopped by police officers. Under the Collaborative Agreement, the results of this data collection effort are to be reported by the Monitor as part of a larger evaluation of whether the goals of the Collaborative are being met. Professors John Eck and Lin Liu and graduate student Lisa Bostaph of the University of Cincinnati were contracted to analyze the data collected.

The vehicle stops that were analyzed by Eck, Liu and Bostaph in their study occurred between July 1, 2001 and December 31, 2001. Contact cards for approximately 7200 vehicle stops were completed by officers for that period.¹ No analysis has been conducted for stops after December 31, 2001.

¹ This figure may be low for six months of vehicle stops by an agency the size of the Cincinnati Police Department. It may be that officers were not making as many stops as usual in this period (perhaps because of the earlier events in April 2001, or because of the advent of the data collection project), that there were stops that were made for which officers did not complete contact cards, or that contact cards for some stops did not make it into the database. Cincinnati should examine these issues.

II. Data Collection in Context

Collecting data on the race of persons stopped by the police is not a panacea. Many jurisdictions have begun the data collection process with high expectations that it will answer “bottom line” questions regarding the existence, or not, of officer bias and racial profiling. These expectations are often disappointed. Communities around the country have found that the analysis of traffic stop and pedestrian stop data is more complicated and more ambiguous than they anticipated. The results can be helpful, but they are never definitive. Instead, they often are most useful in assessing the allocation or deployment of police resources, or in pointing to additional questions to be answered about policing strategies. A significant benefit of data collection is that it leads to a larger public discussion of how policing should be conducted in the jurisdiction.

The University of Cincinnati study falls into this mold. Eck, Liu and Bostaph provide estimates of disproportionality between the racial percentages of persons stopped compared to miles driven by white and black drivers. They then examine four hypotheses for explaining disproportionality in police vehicle stops:

1. Racial bias against African Americans by white officers;
2. Bias stemming from the perception of police officers, both black and white, that African Americans are more likely to be involved in criminal conduct, traffic offenses, or other violations;
3. Disproportionate involvement by African Americans in traffic offenses, criminal conduct, or other violations, brings them to the attention of the police with greater frequency than whites;
4. Policing strategies relying on vehicle stops to prevent or suppress criminal activity has the effect of increasing disproportionality.

Eck, Liu and Bostaph determined that from the data collected and analyzed, they could not eliminate any of the hypotheses. There were disparities in the extent to which black and white motorists were stopped by the police, although this varies by neighborhoods. Some measure of the disparity can be explained by non-racial factors. There are other indications, however, supporting the bias hypotheses that cannot be easily explained. Because we do not know the causes of the disparities, “we must live with the uncertainty,” as the professors put it. Again, however, the usefulness of the University of Cincinnati study should not be underestimated. It raises important questions, points to additional analysis, and suggests further examination of policing strategies and resources.

Another conclusion of many of the studies of traffic stop data collection is that community stakeholders should be involved in the data collection and analysis effort. See Fridell, *Racially Biased Policing: a Principled Response*; www.racialprofilinanalysis.neu.edu; Ramirez, McDevitt, Farrell, *A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection System*. The Cincinnati data collection effort has elements of collaboration. The analysis under the ordinance was made part of the Evaluation Protocol of the Collaborative Agreement. As has become a matter of public note, the Plaintiffs to the Collaborative Agreement and the FOP requested an opportunity to work with the City to interpret the study and add analysis before releasing it. Magistrate Judge Michael Merz agreed to this request and included the UC study in the Court's protective order for the case for 45 days. The Parties to the Collaborative need to build on this study and incorporate it into future analysis under the Evaluation Protocol, including putting it in context with other data collection efforts and other measures of police activity and police-community relations. We also hope and expect that the study will prompt a community dialogue relating to policing in Cincinnati and how residents and the police should interact.

III. Analysis of Data

The most difficult and controversial aspect of the analysis of traffic stop data is the development of a "benchmark" against which to compare the racial percentages of vehicle stops by police officers. The fact that in a given jurisdiction, 25% of the stops within a certain time period were made of African American drivers means little without a sense of whether African Americans are 25%, 50% or 10% of the drivers on the road. Moreover, even an estimate of the percentage of African American drivers may be insufficient if there are variances in driving behavior between blacks and whites (e.g., if white drivers drove more miles than black drivers, or if black drivers speed at higher levels than white drivers). Analysts must estimate the percentage of African American drivers who would likely have been stopped in the absence of any bias or discrimination.

There are a number of different analyses that social scientists have used to develop this "benchmark" figure.

As noted in the UC study, the Census demographics of the jurisdiction are an inadequate measure of those at risk of being stopped. The makeup of persons driving in and through a neighborhood can be very different than the makeup of the persons who live in that neighborhood. Census figures must be adjusted to take into account differences in driving patterns during rush hour, drivers from outside the jurisdiction, and differences in driving behavior, among others. The

analysis also must take account of where and how police officers are deployed. If officers are more heavily deployed to high crime areas, and those areas are predominantly minority, then it is likely that more stops of African Americans will be made, even if each officer stops blacks and whites evenly, based on who they encounter on the roads. If there are special enforcement efforts, such as intensive radar enforcement, in areas that are predominantly of one race or another, that also might skew the statistics of who gets stopped.

Another method of developing a benchmark involves making direct observations of persons on the road at given times, to estimate who is driving in the jurisdiction or who is breaking traffic laws. Such traffic surveys (or “violation surveys” if the observations are of those cars that are committing traffic violations) have been conducted in Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Santa Cruz, CA, among other places. A third method is to compare the traffic stops of an officer or a group of officers such as a squad, to other officers or squads with similar assignments. Such “internal comparisons” with peers help identify units or officers whose stops appear out of the general norm. Similarly, the stops of radar or special traffic units can be compared with the stops of patrol units, on the assumption that radar units focus on speeders and use less discretion in deciding which cars to stop. Last, there are comparisons over time, for any of the above analyses. Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages, and it is important to note that social scientists agree that each of these methods has flaws and can only provide approximations of the population at risk of being stopped by the police.

Disproportionality Measures in UC Study

To establish their benchmarks, Eck, Liu and Bostaph use a combination of adjusted Census figures and estimates from direct observations to develop an estimate of miles driven by blacks and miles driven by whites in each of the City’s 52 neighborhoods.

Because of differences between traffic patterns during rush hour and during other times of the day, Professors Eck and Liu first developed estimates of black and white drivers during rush hour. Traffic counts by the City of Cincinnati establish that 23% of the total daily traffic occurs during rush hours.² To obtain the breakdown of black and white drivers during rush hour, the researchers used students to observe rush hour traffic. Students were located at 126 sites around the City, at four times during the year, to watch passing traffic and observe the race of the

² The researchers use this 23% figure for all of the City’s 52 neighborhoods. We do not know the extent to which rush hour traffic may vary from one neighborhood to the next.

drivers.³ The students' breakdowns of black and white drivers from these 126 sites were then used to estimate the racial percentages for rush hour traffic in the City's 52 neighborhoods. These estimates were then multiplied by the rush hour mileage for each neighborhood (estimated to be 23% of the total miles driven).

Eck, Liu and Bostaph then developed measures for miles driven by black drivers during the day, and white drivers during the day, for each of the City's neighborhoods. For daytime miles, they used U.S. Department of Transportation tables that estimated the number of people traveling from one area to work in another area. These tables were combined with the 2000 Census estimates for driving population for each neighborhood. Finally, the professors estimated night-time miles driven by blacks and whites, by using the racial percentages of the neighborhood from the 2000 Census and multiplying them by the number of miles driven within each neighborhood.

After compiling estimates of miles driven by blacks and by whites for each neighborhood, Eck, Liu and Bostaph compared those figures to the number of stops of black drivers and white drivers in each neighborhood to come up with a "disproportionality index" for each neighborhood. This index, when over 1.0, reflects how much more likely it is that a black driver will be stopped than a white driver for the same number of miles driven.

The Monitor believes that this was a reasonable way to establish a benchmark and assess disproportionality. While there are uncertainties inherent in the methodology as noted below, we believe that the analysis is consistent with those used elsewhere and makes suitable attempts to limit the uncertainties as much as possible given the data available. Moreover, additional refinements can be made for future analyses.

³ The site selection for observations of driver race was based on the following three criteria: (a) traffic flow: the sites chosen for observation should have a large traffic flow volume; (b) geographic distribution: the sites for observation should cover as many neighborhood areas as possible; (c) link to traffic counts by the City: whenever possible, the sites for observation should be selected at the locations where the City conducted traffic counts. This allowed a link from the observation data (with race information) to the detailed traffic counts (without race information). Observations were conducted during both morning and afternoon rush hours.

Monitor's Observations about Analysis

- With respect to rush hour traffic, the accuracy of the estimates will depend on the number of sites that were observed, the length of time observations were made, and the extent to which the traffic at those locations and at those times were representative of traffic in the City as a whole.
- With respect to daytime traffic, the trip tables used by Eck, Liu and Bostaph reflect persons going to work during the day, traveling from one “traffic area zone” to another. Using these tables may to some extent duplicate the commuter/rush hour traffic already estimated by the observation method. Also using the trip tables may underestimate non-work related traffic, especially traffic that is within one neighborhood or traffic area zone. What is not known is whether these potential problems would lead to an underestimation or an overestimation of stop disparities.
- For night-time traffic, several studies from other jurisdictions suggest that the racial makeup of drivers on the road at night may be different than the makeup of persons who live in the neighborhood (as well as being different than the drivers during the day).⁴ The UC study, however, uses the Census population figures to estimate the driving miles at night for black and white drivers in each neighborhood. The study's authors recognize this shortcoming, but use this method in the absence of alternative methods for estimating who is on the roads in the evening. The observation method, for example, has obvious weaknesses given the difficulty of seeing a driver's race at night.
- The UC study notes the problem of drivers from outside Cincinnati. These drivers are among those who are stopped by police, but they are not reflected in the Cincinnati Census demographics. Thus, if the racial breakdown of drivers coming into Cincinnati is different than the demographics of Cincinnati drivers, the daytime and nighttime estimates for black and white driver miles will not be accurate. (The rush hour estimates would be unaffected, as out-of-town drivers were among those observed at the 126 sites.) This problem can be addressed by limiting the daytime and nighttime analysis only to stops involving Cincinnati residents. Officers collect the address of the driver on the contact card, so non-residents can be distinguished from residents.

⁴ The UC analysis of time of stops for white and black drivers (see Figure 1) also suggests differences in the composition of drivers on the road at night versus during the day.

Additional Analysis by UC Researchers

The University of Cincinnati study looked at various factors that may have influenced vehicle stops and may explain a disparity in stops between black and white drivers. To begin with, the researchers compared stops in the City's neighborhoods with traffic accidents. They also examined the correlation between traffic stops and various measures of police activity and criminal behavior, including calls for service, drug related calls for service, serious crimes, and minor crimes. One hypothesis is that by having more police deployed in high crime neighborhoods, the agency may simply make more stops of the drivers in those neighborhoods because that is where the police are. If high crime neighborhoods are more heavily minority, as they are in Cincinnati, African Americans will be disproportionately stopped. A second hypothesis is that, to the extent that African Americans in Cincinnati are involved in criminal behavior or traffic violations more than whites, vehicle stops reflect the police effort to prevent and respond to crime.

In addition to examining who is stopped by the police, Eck, Liu and Bostaph also analyzed data relating to what happened during the stop. This included the duration of the stop, whether a search was conducted, the reason for the search, and whether any contraband was found.

Monitor's Observations:

- The researchers noted that the black drivers stopped by police tended to be slightly younger than the white drivers stopped. Census data can determine whether the African American population in Cincinnati is younger than the white population, as is generally the case.
- Officers record the reason for making a stop on the contact card. The categories are moving violation, equipment violation, suspected criminal offense, occupant or vehicle fits description of suspect, stolen vehicle, or other. Plaintiffs note that officers recorded "other" as the reason for the stop in 7.7% of stops of black drivers, but only 3.2% of stops of white motorists. They recommend that the officers' explanations for "other" stops be analyzed, and that the reasons for the stop be correlated with the race of the officer to determine if there are any patterns that can be discerned.

IV. Conclusions of the UC Study

As noted above, the ultimate conclusion of the UC study is that none of the hypotheses explaining disproportionality can be eliminated. There were disparities that indicated that black drivers were stopped more often than whites. When broken down by miles driven for each neighborhood, 34 neighborhoods had a disproportionality index of more than 1.11 (Eck, Liu and Bostaph characterize indices between .95 and 1.11 as being neutral]. The UC researchers particularly note that nine neighborhoods had a disproportionality index of greater than 2.0.

With respect for why the disparities are occurring, the UC analysis indicates that the pattern of vehicle stops is correlated to measures of police deployment and workload, such as responses to call for service, drug related calls, and crime rates. They are also correlated to accidents. Some of the disproportion may also be due to observable differences in the behaviors of whites and blacks in the City, including potential differences in traffic violations or criminal behavior. But there are other indications that some of the disproportion may be the result of officers' heightened suspicions of black drivers.

Monitor's Observations

1. The first caveat to note is that the data that was examined was from a six month period from 2001. As noted by the authors, it is very possible that an analysis of more recent traffic stops made by CPD officers might yield an entirely different result.
2. Why were persons stopped by Cincinnati police officers? Moving violations were the large majority of stops for both black and white motorists. These were likely to be mostly speeding violations. But 15% of the stops of black drivers were for equipment violations (such as a broken headlight or broken taillight). This is double the percentage of stops for equipment violations among white drivers. Disparities in equipment violation stops have also been found in other cities and studies (e.g., studies in Rhode Island). One potential explanation is that income disparities between black and white residents result in black residents driving older cars, which in turn would likely have more visible equipment violations.⁵ There is at least one alternative explanation, however, relating to disparate treatment of black and white drivers. Some equipment stops are "high discretion" stops, i.e., stops that officers might

⁵ If equipment violation stops do fall more heavily on lower income drivers, it is worth examining whether this disparity is problematic or can be reduced. If stops for equipment violations are effective in reducing traffic accidents, then emphasizing such stops makes sense.

overlook in other circumstances. They can be used as a pretext (a legal one, it should be noted) for stopping a car due to suspicion of other criminal activity or violations, or for general crime suppression purposes.

3. Stops based on suspicion of criminal activity (“crime stops” in the study’s terminology) are twice as likely for black drivers in the study. However, the percentage of black drivers arrested is even higher than the percentage of stops of black drivers that were based on suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, it appears that most of these “crime stops” were productive, resulting in an arrest. In addition, a number of stops of black drivers that were initially made for traffic violations also resulted in an arrest. To confirm the effectiveness of these “crime stops,” future analyses should correlate the reasons for the stop with the results of the stop.⁶ In addition, it would be useful to know what types of arrests are being made. Are these outstanding misdemeanor warrants and capias, disorderly conduct or obstructing charges, or are the arrests for more serious crimes?
4. What can be learned from the measures of disproportionality by neighborhood? Are there any patterns to the disparities that were found? For example, some jurisdictions have found that the greatest disparities were not in heavily African American neighborhoods, but in white areas or in “border” areas where black neighborhoods were adjacent to white neighborhoods. These raised concerns about “out of place” stops (stops used to investigate a white motorist in a predominately black neighborhood or a black motorist in a predominately white neighborhood).
5. Plaintiffs note that the UC study finds disproportionality in 34 neighborhoods, but that the disparities are characterized as “relatively low level” in 25 of these neighborhoods. They suggest that additional information be presented to provide a basis for distinguishing when the disproportion is important or less important.
6. The UC study finds that traffic stops are highly correlated with measures of traffic accidents. To the extent that CPD does not already do so, it would be worthwhile for CPD to examine the vehicle stop and accident data to assess whether any changes in

⁶ It should be noted that officers generally fill in the contact card after the stop has been completed. Thus, a stop that results in an arrest may be categorized by the officer as a “crime stop” even though the initial reason for pulling over the car was for a moving violation.

its deployment or vehicle stop strategies are warranted to further reduce traffic accidents. Visual examination of the density maps of accidents and of stops appears to show that the two are very similar.⁷

7. With respect to the correlations that Eck, Liu and Bostaph find between police workload, crime statistics, and traffic stops, we recommend that the Parties examine whether there is any significance to the fact that stops of white drivers are correlated to calls for service, drug calls, accidents, Part 1 crime and Part 2 crime, but stops of black drivers are correlated only to accidents and Part 2 crimes, but not calls for service, drug calls and Part 1 crimes.
8. The statistics on the outcomes of vehicle stops raise the question of why there is a disparity between the number of black drivers stopped without an arrest, citation or search (23%), compared to the number of white drivers (17%). Similarly, there is also a disparity in the number of black drivers stopped and searched, but not given a citation or arrested (4%), compared to whites (2%). There are at least three possible explanations:
 - i. Officers are stopping black drivers for traffic and other violations, but choosing to give these drivers warnings rather than citations at a higher rate than they give warnings to white drivers;
 - ii. Officers are stopping a higher percentage of black drivers on a pretext, but finding no criminality, letting the motorists drive on;
 - iii. Officers are making a higher percentage of crime stops on black drivers, where they have reasonable suspicion to make the stop, but nothing turns up once the stop is made.To further examine this issue, it may be helpful to correlate the reasons for the stop with the outcomes of the stops.
9. Similar to the issue of motorists searched but not arrested, there is also a disparity between black and white motorists asked for consent to search. Officers asked for a consent search of 6.7% of black drivers stopped, but only 3.3% of white drivers stopped. This could indicate that officers have a higher level of suspicion of black drivers than they have of white drivers.

⁷ While it is difficult to tell only from a visual examination of the maps in the UC study, there appears to be a high number of accidents in West Price Hill and Westwood along Glenway Avenue, but not a similar density of traffic stops.

10. We do note that there were a significant percentage of black drivers who were arrested as a result of vehicle stops, and the percentage is much higher than it was for white drivers. While officers report that only 13% of stops of black drivers are “crime stops,” fully 22% of black drivers stopped during the six months studied were arrested. Among white drivers, 7.1% were arrested. This may provide some explanation for officers’ proclivity to search black drivers. On the other hand, plaintiffs would point out that a higher arrest rate may be due to the deployment strategies of the police department and the fact that if officers search more black drivers, they will likely arrest more black drivers, even if the level of possession of contraband among black and white drivers is the same. Again, it would be useful to get a breakdown of what type of arrests are occurring, to better gauge the effectiveness of traffic stops as a crime fighting tool.
11. The finding that approximately 25% of searches of both black and white drivers resulted in some kind of contraband is significant. First, this level of recovering contraband (or “hit rate”) is relatively high compared to rates found in other studies, indicating that officers are doing a good job of choosing persons to search. Second, the fact that white and black drivers had the same “hit rate” could indicate that black and white drivers carry contraband in the same percentage, which would contradict the notion that black drivers engage in a higher level of drug trafficking. Third, as the study’s authors point out, the finding also could indicate that bias does not influence officers’ search decisions. If officers were indiscriminately searching black drivers and not white drivers, one would expect that officers would be searching a higher percentage of black drivers who were not carrying contraband.
12. One of the items of information collected in each traffic stop is the badge number of the officer making the stop. From this information, the race of the officer making the stop can be determined. Plaintiffs note that had the analyses conducted by Eck, Liu and Bostaph also factored in the race of the officer making the stop, the researchers might have been able to make more definitive statements regarding whether disparities in stops could be attributable to CPD officers generally, or white officers only.
13. Another area of future inquiry is to examine how traffic stops and searches vary among officers in the CPD. In most jurisdictions, there are significant variances among officers – some officers make many traffic stops, others make very few. The same

is true for searches. The police department can use this data to more effectively manage its officers and assignments. Are there expectations set for officers on the number of moving violations, parking violations and arrest that should be made in a given period? If so, are those expectations being met, and are they reasonable? Officer stop data can also be used to assess whether there are officers whose stops are significantly different in racial makeup from the stops of peers who have similar assignments.

V. Recommendations

1. Under the Collaborative Agreement, the City must continue to collect and analyze data on all vehicle stops. Similarly, the City is required to collect and analyze data on all pedestrian stops. The findings of these continuing studies will be incorporated in the Parties' efforts under the Evaluation Protocol of the Collaborative Agreement. The results of these analyses will be included in the Monitor's Reports, as required by the Collaborative. The Parties to the Collaborative need to work together with the Evaluator (an outside contractor to be chosen under the Collaborative) to agree on the methodology to be used in these analyses. This is especially true for pedestrian stops, for which no analysis has yet been done.
2. The Police Department must make efforts to ensure that the data provided for future analyses are up-to-date and that the data is as error-free as possible. The delays in inputting the 2001 data and the poor quality of the data necessitated significant additional work for the UC team in correcting errors. In addition, there needs to be mechanisms to audit whether contact cards are completed for all stops made by officers, and to audit the data on the contact cards. We understand that some efforts in this direction have been made by the CPD.
3. Cincinnati should consider the information collected for the 2001 study, to determine if there are additional fields or factors needed for future analysis.
4. To the extent possible, future analysis should use the findings of the UC study as a benchmark, so that the Parties can assess what changes have occurred over time.
5. The City of Cincinnati and the Parties to the Collaborative need to put information on vehicle stops in the context of the larger Evaluation Protocol, including the analysis of other data by race, such as arrests, crimes and drug calls, and uses of force.

6. We recommend that the Cincinnati community organize a series of community forums on the UC study and the issue of bias-free policing.
7. The UC study should be examined with a focus on whether there are any changes in police practices, procedures or strategies that are warranted by the results. To the extent that the data shows disproportionality in traffic stops, what actions can be taken that might reduce this disproportionality, regardless of the cause?

VI. Conclusion

Statistics and research studies are useful for the light they can shed on real events. But statistics and social science won't address how persons in the community are feeling. The concerns of minority residents in Cincinnati are real and need to be addressed. This is what the Collaborative Agreement is meant to do. Through community engagement, the implementation of CPOP, and the bias-free policing provisions of the Collaborative, Cincinnati has an opportunity to improve police-community relations and increase confidence in the fairness of police actions. To do so, however, all segments of the Cincinnati community must use this study as a jumping off point for further dialogue.

The issues of community distrust and concerns over biased policing go well beyond just traffic stops. These concerns extend to arrests, use of force, who is going to jail, and disproportion in the criminal justice system as a whole. In this light, it is necessary to examine what we are asking our police to do. Police departments in today's urban settings are in a dilemma, because they are faced with conflicting expectations and directions. On the one hand, residents of high crime neighborhoods complain about the lack of police visibility and demand more police services and protection. We respond to these concerns by increasing police deployment in these neighborhoods. Similarly, recent emphasis on "hot spots" and other efforts to target criminal activity have similar effects. This can lead to greater disproportionality in stops. Police departments need to openly discuss their deployment decisions and strategies, so that their actions do not lead to increased complaints about police activity from very same communities that are seeking greater police presence.

Explicit in the Collaborative Agreement is the need for all segments of the community to engage in a dialogue about policing in Cincinnati. As the Parties have stated: "The traffic stop report is a valuable aid in our continuing effort as a collaborative and as a community to achieve a safe city through fair strategies, mutual accountability and positive

engagement of the police and the citizens.” Through dialogue, the community and the police can jointly evaluate the effectiveness of traffic stop efforts, assess options beyond arrests for dealing with crime and disorder problems, and develop the best strategies for policing Cincinnati’s neighborhoods.

References

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Fridell, Lorie, Robert Lunney, Drew Diamond and Bruce Kubu. *Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response*. 2001. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center.
www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu. [A federally funded clearinghouse of information on data collection efforts.]

**REPORT OF COLLABORATIVE PARTIES TO MONITOR
RE TRAFFIC STOP STUDY BY ECK AND LIU
October 30, 2003**

I. Introduction

Pursuant to ¶30 of the Collaborative Agreement (CA), the traffic stop report by Eck and Liu has been integrated into the overall evaluation efforts under the CA. The parties have reviewed the report and met to discuss its contents. This report does not address any questions the parties may have about the traffic stop study.

II. Conclusions Shared by the Collaborative Parties

- A. The report finds unexplained disproportionality based upon race in traffic stops in Cincinnati.
- B. Racial disproportionality in traffic stops is a challenge to perceived legitimacy of police action.
- C. Disproportionality by race may or may not be related to bias, preexisting conditions, and policing strategies.
- D. The Collaborative Agreement addresses many of the issues raised by the report and its implementation will serve as the primary response by the parties to the challenges posed by the report, in particular:
 - 1. Community Problem Oriented Policing (CPOP) ¶¶ 16-29
See First Annual Report of parties on CPOP, August 2003
 - 2. Mutual Accountability and Evaluation ¶¶ 30-46
Parties are in final stages of selecting a vendor to provide ongoing evaluation of efforts to improve police community relations and effectiveness of police actions
 - 3. Use of Force ¶¶ 47-49
Implementation is ongoing of these terms and the Memorandum of Agreement with the Justice Department
 - 4. Bias Free Policing ¶¶ 51-54
Data collection and analysis shall continue for the life of the agreement.
 - 5. Civilian Review ¶¶ 55-89
Credible professional, independent review of alleged police misconduct helps build credibility and acceptance of police action.

III. Conclusion

The traffic stop report is a valuable aid in our continuing effort as a collaborative and as a community to achieve a safe city through fair strategies, mutual accountability and positive engagement of the police and the citizens.

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